Two Ways To End The World

TWO WAYS TO END THE WORLD

TEST TUBE MONSTERS FROM THE U OF M

By Martin Porter

ANN ARBOR-The world may suddenly come to an end one day, silently, with no spectacular blast from a nuclear bomb, no mushroom cloud, no fallout-yet still the same mass destruction, the same human misery. The hospitals would be overcrowded with millions of the dying, their bodies racked with pain. The cities would be quiet; their only sounds would be ambulance sirens and screams in the night.

The physicians would be perplexed by the origins of this new, mysterious plague; they would be powerless to do any more than ease the suffering and bury the dead. There would be no antidote, no wonder drug to save the day.

And it could all begin with a miniscule particle, a bacterium or hybrid virus that escaped from a laboratory on the University of Michigan's Ann Arbor campus. Microbiologists here may be risking just such a catastrophe under the justification of "freedom of inquiry" and the desire to understand and control life.

On May 21, by a six-to-one vote, the University of Michigan Regents gave the go-ahead to local scientists, allowing them to resume their inquiries into the essence of life via the little-known discipline of genetic engineering.

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Advocates of such research claim it could cure anything from the common cold to cancer, produce new food supplies, and gobble up oil spills. Yet such research could potentially bring about the demise of humanity, accidentally or intentionally unleashing toxins that could cause epidemics reminiscent of late-night Grade-B science-fiction thrillers.

The Regents, affirming their "dedication to the advancement of the human race," held a year-long, see-saw debate, then decided it was worth the risk.

"Recombinant DNA research," as it is known, is a new field if microbiological investigation concerned with grafting genes [the units of heredity that combine to form the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) molecule], from one species to the genes of another species. Experimenters have already transferred genes from toads and sea urchins to bacteria. These "recombinant" DNA molecules, containing, for example, both toad and bacterial DNA, can be replaced in the bacterial cell environment and can reproduce themselves as the cells multiply.

Scientists thus have the capability of creating new life forms in their test tubes, organisms with unique gene combinations for which no natural mechanism of formation is known. Yet because these methods are new, researchers cannot predict what will happen. They cannot assess without doubt what properties will appear and what ones will not following the splicing and implantation of new DNA cells. Nor can researchers accurately predict what effect these new biological organisms will have on the environment.

This view is supported by even the most devoted DNA research zealots, who all concede that there is a certain degree of risk involved with these early stages of research.

"POTENTIAL HAZARDS"

Robert B. Helling, an associate professor in biological sciences at the University of Michigan, who will be doing much of the initial genetic research at the campus laboratories, claims that there is a significant possibility that researchers will be able to use bacterial cells as "factories" to produce insulin for the treatment of diabetes.

Never before has this potentially valuable research been attempted. According to Helling, who was a member of the Stanford team that first inserted genes from a South African toad into bacterial cells, "No one has tried to produce insulin or other proteins from humans or other mammals in bacteria because there are potential hazards, as well as the obvious benefits associated with trying to do this."

It was just this fear that caused Helling and his colleagues throughout the world to gather in Asilomar, California in February 1975 to consider the potential hazards of genetic engineering. A moratorium was called on the most hazardous forms of recombinant DNA research, and for the first time, public attention was drawn to the potentially catastrophic results of such research.

It was this moratorium that led the National Institute of Health (NIH) to draw up uniform national guidelines. It also resulted in lengthy debates on the subject on campuses like the University of Michigan.

The dangers of recombinant DNA research were weighed against the potential benefits by the so-called "Committee B" at the U of M.
 

Reaching a final report in March of this year, the committee advised the Regents that the research should be allowed, as long as it is submitted to appropriate controls. In its report, the committee stated, "We believe that the current NIH guidelines are an acceptable basis for assuring the safety of experimentation in molecular genetics and viral oncology [the study of tumors]. We have come to this conclusion with some uneasiness because a risk remains, though it is small."

Yet the list of "potential hazards" the committee enumerated in its report seems far from small.

The Committee listed four dangers inherent in recombinant DNA research:

• Infection of animals is not entirely improbable. The work so far has used the E. coli bacteria as the host, and some strains of E. coli are commonly found in the gut and throat of humans and other animals.
• An organism may inadvertently be created which has an unexpected degree of toxicity. This involves the possibility of unwanted DNA tagging along in an experiment and creating unanticipated effects. It is possible that these effects might not develop or be detected for many years.
• Organisms with new properties, even those with potential agricultural or medical benefits, could disturb existing ecological systems with results that are difficult to predict.
• As is the case with many technological advances, some people may deliberately use the products of DNA technology in ways that could do harm to others.

CAN THEY CONTROL IT?

The first two hazards-namely, the possibility of infection and the creation of unwanted and potentially dangerous organisms-could be easily averted, at least in the eyes of the committee, because they believe that the NIH guidelines basically protected against such occurrences.

The NIH guidelines represent a combination of two protective measures: physical containment, which specifies the proper laboratory construction requirements and procedures for handling the micro-organisms; and biological containment, which specifies the use of greatly weakened strains of the E. coli bacteria which, it is claimed, cannot survive outside the laboratory.

Yet critics have blasted both these protective measures as inadequate and far from fail-safe. This is the crux of the recent debates: How much control do microbiologists, who boast so brashly about their abilities to control accidents and to cope with the mysteries of the unknown, actually have?

The critics of biological containment have found support even amongst those who were originally involved with creating the weakened, so called "x1776" E. Coli strain.

This strain is "disarmed" through the deletion of certain genes. Supporters claim that it would be highly improbable that the bacterium could, through mutation, revert to a form in which it could survive outside the laboratory.

Yet, according to Dr. Roy Curtis, a University of Alabama biologist responsible for the development of this disarmed strain, "It is my current opinion that the use of genetically disarmed hosts . . .in conjunction with appropriate physical containment facilities should reduce the probabilities of danger of organisms in the biosphere. Nevertheless, this is not a reason to reduce our guard, since much information is missing which would permit more accurate assessments of potential bio-hazards associated with recombinant DNA molecule research."

In addition, Curtis' calculations concerning the life span of these disarmed E. coli strains have been challenged. Robert Sinsheimer, a California Institute of Technology biologist, doubts that biological containment is adequate. "I do not rest easy with Roy Curtis' data," he said, "because I expect other events with which he has not reckoned will come into play at much higher probabilities."

Other critics maintain that Curtis' predictions cannot apply for such contingencies as contamination. Arthur Schwartz,

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professor of mathematics at the U of M, claims that the existing theory "provides no assurance that transformation of the disarmed host or transfer of foreign DNA to a contaminating strain of E. coli cannot occur. Moreover, the details of the processes of conjugation and transformation are not understood. We cannot be confident that a disarmed strain will remain disarmed after years or even months of use."

IRREVERSIBLE ERRORS

A similar concern has been voiced in regard to the physical containment standards set up by NIH, which will be used to design the $306,000 renovated main campus laboratories (all but $80,000 supplied by the National Cancer Institute). The labs will be built to contain so-called "moderate risk" or "P-3" experiments, which is the second most dangerous category of genetic engineering under the NIH guidelines.

Physical containment, it is said, will be accomplished by maintaining low air pressures inside the laboratories so that air leaks will be avoided. Exhausted air and wastes will be incinerated, and experiments will be performed inside special chambers, sometimes by remote control.

Yet questions have been raised over the ability of researchers to maintain a failsafe physical environment for potentially lethal organisms.

According to Dr. Susan Wright, an associate professor of science and technology at the University, "In reality, theoretical expectations are complicated by the fact that humans make mistakes, and the best equipment sometimes breaks down."

For example, University of Michigan lab accidents in 1975 included 293 puncture wounds and cuts, 25 bites from lab animals, 35 chemical injuries, 15 other injuries, seven allergic reactions and 23 injurious exposures to pathogens.

The point was best expressed by Richard Goldstein, assistant professor of microbiology at Harvard University Medical School. At a public forum earlier this year at the U of M, he stated, "Sloppiness, apathy, carelessness, all human attributes, all everyday realities of laboratory science, combine to make this kind of containment meaningful only where potential danger does not exist."

In addition, Goldstein supports Committee B's contention that recombinant DNA research may have potentially dangerous effects on the environment and the ecological balance of nature.

"Experimenting with the unknown future dangers of the E. coli is not like using

Photo: Joel Unangst

DDT," he explained. "When we discovered DDT's dangers, we stopped using it. Eventually the pesticide will work its way out of the environment.

"With recombinant DNA, if something gets out and survives, we will have to live with it. What we are doing is almost certainly irreversible."

The last possible hazard mentioned in the Committee's report is one of utmost significance, although it is often scoffed at or ignored by many recombinant DNA proponents: the question of whether recombinant DNA advances may be used as a weapon, either by super-powers eager to conquer the world or by small terrorist bands.

Marc Ross, a university physics professor, compared this to the nuclear power question: "There were a few professionals who raised critical questions in the early days of nuclear power development," he said. "However, their warnings were scarcely heard because of the powerful promotion of nuclear war power with which the government and nuclear industry inundated the public."

Development of recombinant DNA research for the purpose of destroying human life was outlawed by the Biological Warfare treaty of 1972, signed by the United States and 110 other nations. But as was pointed out in the April newsletter of the Federation of American Scientists, "Since treaties are neither universal nor self-enforcing, the world must begin to face a biological proliferation threat that might, before long, rival that of nuclear weapons."

"NEITHER WISDOM NOR RESPONSIBILITY"

Throughout the debates, only a small faction opposed the research on ethical, rather than scientific, grounds. Even diehard critics such as Susan Wright believe that the research should go ahead, but at the "appropriate time," when more is known about biological containment. Sinsheimer believes that the research should only be delayed until a national policy can be formulated, and that the research should be conducted only in a few, highly specificalized locations.

The ethical argument against recombinant DNA research, largely ignored in the U of M debate, was fostered primarily by two individuals who saw this new power as threatening and beyond the capabilities of humanity.

The only dissenting member of Committee B, Shaw Livermore, professor of history, observed that the new techniques may provide a "capability to alter in a fundamental way.

"While it clearly would present opportunities for meeting present sources of human distress," he explained, "I believe that the limitations of our social capacities for directing such a capability to fulfilling human purposes will more likely bring with it a train of awesome and possibly disastrous consequences."

This position was made again at a December Regents meeting. Philosophy professor Henryk Skolimowski said, "In pursuing the DNA research, we are actually beginning to tamper with the nature of life itself. In order to tamper with the nature of life in a fundamental way, we have to have wisdom and moral responsibility, whereas, in my opinion, we have neither.

"We can't expect the scientists themselves to attack the problem, because many are so immersed in their work they don't even perceive it, and those who do perceive it probably believe it would be against their own best interests to get involved," he added.

And still, the recombinant DNA research will go on, probably in the fall. The Regents at the U of M, while priding themselves on their openness in dealing with this highly volatile debate, appear to have already made up their minds. No ethical nor scientific doubts were allowed to threaten the university's coveted reputation as the "Research Capital of the Midwest," not even the frighteningly real possibility that one accidental spill could spread a deadly infection throughout the Ann Arbor community, throughout the State of Michigan, and throughout the world, creating a startling real life catastrophe-one which, until now, had been seen only in the pages of science fiction novels.

Martin Porter is an Ann Arbor-based free-lance writer who has worked for the Michigan Daily and the Atlanta Constitution.